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SHARE THE WEALTH? KERR V 
BARANOW AND THE “JOINT FAMILY 
VENTURE” 
 




The Supreme Court of Canada has issued an important decision 
in Kerr v. Baranow1 regarding property claims between 
unmarried partners upon separation. The most notable aspect of 
the decision is a change to the available remedies for a 
successful unjust enrichment claim. The Court confirmed that a 
monetary award need not be calculated on a fee-for-services 
basis, but may reflect a share of the wealth acquired during the 
relationship proportionate to the claimant's contributions. This 
remedy is available only upon proof that the partners were 
engaged in a “joint family venture”. I will assess this 
development in the law in terms of the likely effect of the 
definition of the joint family venture on women's inequality, 
the Court’s conception of the family with an underpinning 
focus on individual choice in relationships, and the capacity of 
the new framework to adequately recognize women's 




In order to assess the changes made in Kerr v. Baranow, I will 
provide a brief overview of the development of the law of 
unjust enrichment in the family law context, which originated 
from trust principles developed in English law. The use of 
                                                
*  Third-year student at UBC Faculty of Law. I would like to thank 
Professor Susan B. Boyd for her valuable feedback on this paper. 
1  Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 SCR 269 [Kerr, SCC].  
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resulting and constructive trust remedies in property claims by 
spouses dates back prior to matrimonial property legislation. 
While the distinction between resulting and constructive trusts 
was sometimes blurred in the context of marital relationships, 
the two trusts have different historical origins. Resulting trusts 
arose based on the presumed intention of the parties where one 
person held title to property for which another person provided 
consideration, while constructive trusts arose by operation of 
law on grounds of fairness.2 
 
 In the 1950s and 1960s, courts in England and Canada 
struggled with how to deal with the division of assets upon 
marriage breakdown. The application of traditional trust 
presumptions, including the resulting trust, in the context of 
marital relationships was criticised as being artificial and 
unhelpful.3 In Rimmer v. Rimmer,4 a 1952 decision of the 
English Court of Appeal, it was decided for the first time that 
an equal division of property between two spouses was 
appropriate, applying the maxim “equality is equity”. The facts 
were that one spouse had contributed financially and 
substantially, but in an unquantifiable amount, to an asset 
acquired in the other’s name, and there was no evidence as to 
their intentions. Two schools of thought emerged on the 
interpretation of this case: those who thought that the Court 
divided property equally in the absence of any intent to share, 
and those who thought that the Court found an “implied intent” 
to share equally.5 
                                                
2  Simone Wong, “Constructive trusts over the family home: lessons to 
be learned from other commonwealth jurisdictions?” (1998) 18 LS 
369 at 370. 
3  Donovan WM Waters, Mark R Gillen & Lionel D Smith, eds, 
Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 3d ed (Toronto: Thomson, 2005) at 
418-419. 
4  Rimmer v Rimmer, [1952] 2 All ER 863, [1953] 1 QB 63 [Rimmer]. 
5  Waters, Gillen, & Smith, supra note 3 at 419. 
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 In Gissing v. Gissing6 and Pettitt v. Pettitt,7 the House 
of Lords confirmed that intent was required for a trust to exist, 
referring to “resulting, implied or constructive trusts” without 
distinction. Courts could not impose or ascribe an intent in 
order to get to a fair solution such as an equal division, and the 
“equality is equity” approach was restricted to the particular 
circumstances of the Rimmer case. A claimant’s success thus 
turned on the willingness of a court to find an implied common 
intention to share property.8  
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada initially followed the 
English approach taken in Gissing and Pettitt. A resulting trust 
was a difficult remedy to obtain since the claimant had to prove 
that she made a direct financial contribution to the acquisition 
of property held by her spouse,9 or that there was a common 
intention that a beneficial interest in the property was held for 
her. For example, in Murdoch v. Murdoch,10 the majority 
declined to award Ms. Murdoch a share of the farm property 
held by her husband on the basis that she had not contributed 
financially to the acquisition of the property, and there was no 
common intention that she would get a share. Laskin J., in 
dissent, would have held that her contributions in labour on the 
farm were sufficient to make out a claim in unjust enrichment 
for which she could be awarded a constructive trust remedy.  
 
                                                
6  Gissing v Gissing, [1970] 2 All ER 780, [1970] 3 WLR 255 
[Gissing]. 
7  Pettitt v Pettitt, [1969] 2 All ER 385, [1969] 2 WLR 966 [Pettitt]. 
8  Waters, supra note 3 at 420-421. 
9  Thompson v Thompson, [1961] SCR 3, (1960) 26 DLR (2d) 1. 
10  Murdoch v Murdoch, [1975] 1 SCR 423, (1973) 41 DLR (3d) 367 
[Murdoch cited to SCR]. 
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 In Rathwell v. Rathwell,11 the Supreme Court of 
Canada departed from the English authorities and developed a 
unique approach using the law of unjust enrichment as a basis 
for the imposition of a constructive trust, building on Laskin 
J.’s dissent in Murdoch. The facts in Rathwell were similar to 
those in Murdoch, but the majority held that Ms. Rathwell's 
claim succeeded both on the basis of a resulting trust due to her 
direct contribution to the acquisition of the property, and on the 
basis that her contributions in labour on the farm made out a 
claim in unjust enrichment. In order to make a successful 
unjust enrichment claim, the claimant must show that the 
defendant was enriched, that she suffered a corresponding 
deprivation, and that there was no juristic reason for the 
enrichment.12 The acquisition of property by the husband, 
which he would not have acquired if not for the wife's labour, 
constituted an unjust enrichment. A remedial constructive trust 
was imposed on the basis that he could not in good conscience 
retain the beneficial interest in the property.13  
 
 Although provincial matrimonial property legislation 
was enacted in the 1970s and introduced a regime in which 
property or the value thereof is presumptively divided equally 
between spouses upon divorce, it did not apply to unmarried 
couples. Therefore, unmarried partners continued to claim trust 
remedies to get a share of property. The majority in Pettkus v. 
Becker held that there was “no basis for any distinction, in 
dividing property and assets, between marital relationships and 
those more informal relationships which subsist for a lengthy 
period.”14 In Sorochan v. Sorochan, the Court held that a 
                                                
11  Rathwell v Rathwell, [1978] 2 SCR 436, (1977) 83 DLR (3d) 289 
[Rathwell cited to SCR].  
12  Ibid at 455.  
13  Ibid at 461. 
14  Pettkus v Becker, [1980] 2 SCR 834 at 850, (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257 
[Pettkus]. 
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claimant's contributions need not relate to the acquisition of 
property. A contribution to the preservation, maintenance and 
improvement of property is sufficient for a constructive trust.15 
Finally, in Peter v. Beblow, the Court held that domestic 
services were sufficient to make out a claim in unjust 
enrichment. However, the Court limited the remedial 
constructive trust by holding that it is only available if a 
monetary award would be inadequate and there is a link 
between the claimant's contributions and the specific 
property.16  
 
 The above line of cases from the Supreme Court of 
Canada represents an incremental recognition that women's 
contributions to a spousal relationship should be recognized as 
economic contributions, and that this should not depend on 
whether she is married. This progress came to somewhat of a 
halt when the constitutional challenge in Nova Scotia (Attorney 
General) v. Walsh17 failed. Walsh argued that the exclusion of 
unmarried spouses from the provincial matrimonial property 
regime was a violation of the equality rights of unmarried 
spouses under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.18 The majority held that marriage is a relevant 
difference upon which distinctions may be drawn. A major 
consideration in the judgment was that it is an individual 
choice whether to marry, and that autonomy should be 
                                                
15  Sorochan v Sorochan, [1986] 2 SCR 38 at 50, (1986) 29 DLR (4th) 1 
[Sorochan]. 
16  Peter v Beblow, [1993] 1 SCR 980 at 997, (1992) 101 DLR (4th) 621 
[Peter]. 
17  Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4 
SCR 325 [Walsh]. 
18  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11 [Charter]. 
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respected by not imposing the marital property regime on those 
who did not choose it.19  
 
 Some Canadian provinces and territories have chosen 
to include unmarried couples in their family property regimes. 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nunavut and Northwest Territories 
have extended their definition of “spouse” to include unmarried 
persons who have cohabited for a certain period, including for 
the purposes of family property division. Nova Scotia allows 
unmarried couples to opt into the property regime through 
registration. The law of Quebec only recognizes marriages and 
registered civil unions.20 British Columbia’s new Family Law 
Act21 will for the first time include unmarried persons who have 
lived in a “marriage-like relationship” for at least 2 years in the 
family property regime, which I will discuss further below. In 
the jurisdictions where they are still excluded, unmarried 
cohabitants must continue to rely on resulting trust and the law 
of unjust enrichment.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Ms. Kerr and Mr. Baranow began their relationship in 1981 
and lived together for 25 years, during which time they built 
their "dream home" on property owned by Mr. Baranow known 
                                                
19  Walsh, supra note 19 at para 43. 
20  However, at the time of writing, a constitutional equality rights 
challenge to the exclusion of unregistered relationships in Quebec 
from all family law protections in the Quebec Civil Code, including 
spousal support and property division, is pending before the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The challenge was successful at the Quebec Court 
of Appeal on the spousal support issue, but not the property issue in 
light of Walsh (Droit de la famille — 102866, 2010 QCCA 1978, 
(2010) 89 RFL (6th) 1, leave to appeal to SCC granted, Québec (PG) 
c A, [2011] 1 SCR ix). 
21  Bill C-16, Family Law Act, 4th Sess, 39th Leg, British Columbia, 
2011 (as passed 23 November 2011). 
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as the Wall Street property. He paid for the construction, while 
she was involved with planning, interior decorating and 
cleaning. The property increased in value over the course of the 
relationship from $205,000 to $942,50022 and Ms. Kerr 
claimed a share of the property based on resulting trust and 
unjust enrichment.  
 
 Mr. Baranow came into the relationship wealthier than 
Ms. Kerr, who was in financial trouble after her divorce due to 
having guaranteed some of her former husband's debt. She had 
a home known as the Coleman property, which was subject to 
foreclosure. Because she could not afford to save the property, 
Mr. Baranow paid to acquire it and guaranteed a new 
mortgage. During the relationship, the couple kept separate 
finances. Mr. Baranow was responsible for the mortgage 
payments on both properties, while Ms. Kerr paid other 
household expenses. The Coleman property was eventually 
sold. The couple did not have any children together, but Ms. 
Kerr had children from her previous marriage. She suffered a 
stroke in 1991, which left her in need of care and unable to 
return to work. The relationship deteriorated and in 2006 Mr. 
Baranow decided he did not want her to return home after a 
hospital stay for surgery.23   
 
 The trial judge awarded Ms. Kerr a monetary award of 
$315,000, which represented a one-third interest in the Wall 
Street property, on the basis of resulting trust.24 The trial judge 
also held that Ms. Kerr was entitled to the $315,000 as 
compensation for unjust enrichment.25 Her claim for unjust 
enrichment was based on gratuitous transfers of property to Mr. 
                                                
22  Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at para 174. 
23  Ibid at paras 170, 172, 175. 
24  Ibid at para 84. 
25  Kerr v Baranow, 2007 BCSC 1863 at para 100, (2007) 47 RFL (6th) 
103 [Kerr, BCSC]. 
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Baranow and her equity in the Coleman property, in addition to 
a number of benefits provided by her including household 
expenses, spousal services, and assistance with planning and 
purchase of chattels for the new home.26 The trial judge 
rejected Mr. Baranow's claim for unjust enrichment because 
Ms. Kerr did most housework and paid household expenses 
over the course of the relationship, except for a short one-and-
a-half year period at the end of the relationship when he cared 
for her.27  
 
 The resulting trust was overturned by the BC Court of 
Appeal due to the trial judge's factual errors in finding that Ms. 
Kerr had gratuitously transferred property to Mr. Baranow and 
that she had equity in the Coleman property which, when sold, 
was contributed to the new home.28 The Court of Appeal also 
overturned Ms. Kerr's unjust enrichment claim on the basis that 
Mr. Baranow's contributions constituted a juristic reason for 
the enrichment. His contributions included paying the 
mortgage and other expenses, taking early retirement, and 
caring for Ms. Kerr after her stroke.29 The Court of Appeal 
ordered a re-hearing of Mr. Baranow's unjust enrichment claim, 
and Ms. Kerr’s claim was dismissed.   
 
 While this comment will focus on the unjust 
enrichment claim in Kerr v. Baranow, the facts and result of 
the companion case Vanasse v. Seguin are useful for the 
purpose of comparison. Ms. Vanasse and Mr. Seguin were in a 
relationship for 12 years and had two children together. She left 
her job to take on most domestic responsibilities, while he 
worked to develop a company that was eventually sold for $11 
                                                
26  Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at para 186. 
27  Kerr, BCSC, supra note 27 at para 87. 
28  Ibid at para 182. 
29  Kerr, SCC supra note 1 at para 188. 
Share the Wealth? 
 
million. Ms. Vanasse received a monetary award representing a 
portion of the increase in the value of the business based on 
unjust enrichment.30 The trial judge divided the relationship 
into three distinct periods. Unjust enrichment was established 
during the second period when Ms. Vanasse stayed home with 
the children and Mr. Seguin worked long hours up until the 
time his company was sold. There was no unjust enrichment 
during the first period and third periods of the relationship. The 
first period took place before they had children and both 
worked full time and kept separate finances. During the third 
period, after the company was sold, Ms. Vanasse continued 
with the household responsibilities and Mr. Seguin worked 
mostly from home and was more available to the family. 
During the first and third periods, their contributions were 
described as “proportionate”.31  
 
 The contributions of Ms. Vanasse during the period of 
unjust enrichment were directly linked to Mr. Seguin’s 
business success, as he could not have put all of his energy into 
the company without Ms. Vanasse assuming all of the 
household responsibilities. A monetary award was appropriate 
given Mr. Seguin’s ability to pay and the lack of a sufficiently 
direct and substantial link between her contributions and the 
company to warrant a constructive trust. The monetary award 
was based on the pro-rated amount of the $8.4 million increase 
in Mr. Seguin’s net worth for the three-and-a-half year period 
of unjust enrichment. Although the most significant increase in 
fact took place during the unjust enrichment period, the judge 
prorated the increase over the entire twelve-year relationship 
and deducted Ms. Vanasse’s interest in the home and RRSPs, 
yielding an award of just under $1 million.32 The Court of 
Appeal held that the award should have been calculated on a 
                                                
30  Ibid at para 140. 
31  Ibid at para 136. 
32  Ibid at para 140. 
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fee-for-services basis, and that the trial judge failed to consider 




Cromwell J. wrote the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Canada. The three issues related to the law of unjust 
enrichment, which will be the focus of this comment, were the 
nature of the monetary remedy for a successful unjust 
enrichment claim, the role of mutual benefit conferral, and the 
role of the parties' legitimate expectations in the unjust 
enrichment analysis. The Court also dealt with the status of the 
“common intention resulting trust”, and decided that it is 
doctrinally unsound and has no further role to play in the 
resolution of domestic cases. Unjust enrichment provides a less 
artificial and more principled basis for recovery.34 
 
 The Court confirmed that the elements of an unjust 
enrichment claim are an enrichment, a corresponding 
deprivation, and the absence of a juristic reason for the 
enrichment. The remedy is for the defendant to reverse the 
unjust enrichment.35 Peter v. Beblow established that a 
monetary award is the preferred remedy. Where a monetary 
award is insufficient, a constructive trust may be imposed if the 
claimant can show a nexus between her contributions and the 
specific property.36 The Court noted that there has been a 
widespread view that the only two remedial options are a 
constructive trust or a monetary award calculated on a “value-
received” basis (also referred to as fee-for-services or quantum 
meruit). It has been unclear whether it is possible to calculate 
                                                
33  Ibid at para 127. 
34  Ibid at para 28.  
35  Ibid at para 46. 
36  Ibid at para 50. 
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the award on a “value-survived” basis; giving the claimant a 
share of the increase in wealth over the course of the 
relationship.37 
 
Monetary Remedy for Unjust Enrichment  
 
 The Court held that a monetary remedy for unjust enrichment 
need not be calculated on a fee-for-services basis. The remedial 
dichotomy between value received and constructive trust is 
based on the view that there are only two types of claims: a 
claim for the provision of unpaid services, and a claim for 
contribution to the acquisition, improvement, maintenance or 
preservation of a specific property. However, the Court 
identified a third basis for recovery: a situation where the 
parties were engaged in a joint family venture (“JFV”) and 
both parties made contributions linked to the generation of 
wealth, but one party retained a disproportionate share of the 
assets. In such a case, the monetary award should reflect the 
share of the wealth proportionate to the claimant's 
contributions,38 which corresponds to the value-survived 
method.   
 
 Thus, in order for a claimant to get a monetary award 
for unjust enrichment based on value survived, she must show 
first that the couple was engaged in a JFV, and second that her 
contributions were linked to the accumulation of wealth. Upon 
proof of these two elements, the wealth will not necessarily be 
split equally between the parties but will be proportional to 
each person's contributions. The Court stated that this approach 
is consistent with Walsh, which emphasized the importance of 
autonomy but approved of the use of unjust enrichment “to 
                                                
37  Ibid at para 49, 57. 
38  Ibid at paras 59-60, 87. 
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respond to the plethora of forms and functions of common law 
relationships.”39  
 
 Cohabitation with a partner does not raise a 
presumption of a JFV.40 The Court provided relevant factors to 
analyze the relationship under four headings: mutual effort, 
economic integration, actual intent, and priority of the family. 
None of the factors are required for a finding of a JFV, and the 
list of factors is not closed. The factors are taken from several 
prior cases of unjust enrichment. Although the Court refers to 
prior cases such as Pettkus and Peter as examples of a JFV, the 
requirement that a JFV be shown as a separate test for the 
value-survived remedy is new.  
 
 “Mutual effort” concerns whether the parties worked 
toward common goals, and includes factors such as the pooling 
of effort and resources including domestic labour, the decision 
to have children, and the length of the relationship. "Economic 
integration" relates to how financially interdependent the 
parties were and includes factors such as a joint bank account, 
the sharing of expenses, and common savings. Under the 
heading of “actual intent”, the Court emphasized the 
importance of autonomy in domestic relationships. Since 
partners may make a deliberate choice not to marry, their actual 
intent whether to be economically intertwined must be given 
considerable weight. Relevant factors include acceptance that 
the relationship is equivalent to marriage, conduct that 
indicates an intent to share wealth, and plans for distribution of 
property on death. Title to property may also reflect an intent to 
share wealth. Interestingly, although the common intention 
resulting trust approach was rejected, intent is an important 
factor in the unjust enrichment analysis. The final heading is 
“priority of the family” which includes detrimental reliance on 
                                                
39  Ibid at paras 81-82. 
40  Ibid at paras 84-85. 
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the relationship such as leaving the workforce, relocating or 
foregoing career or educational advancement.41  
 
Role of Mutual Benefit Conferral 
 
When an unjust enrichment claim is based on a JFV, the fact 
that both parties conferred benefits on one another is implicitly 
taken into account in determining the share of wealth 
proportionate to each person's contributions. The approach is 
different on a fee-for-services claim, in which case mutual 
benefits should generally be considered at the defence and 
remedy stage, with the effect of reducing the claimant's 
recovery by the amount of the countervailing benefit 
provided.42 Mutual benefit may also play a limited role at the 
juristic reason stage if it provides evidence that the enrichment 
was just.43  
 
Role of the Parties' Legitimate Expectations 
 
In the earlier unjust enrichment cases such as Pettkus and 
Sorochan, the claimant's legitimate expectations that she would 
get a share of property and the defendant's knowledge of those 
expectations were taken into account as part of the juristic 
reason analysis. The principle was that it would be unjust for 
the defendant to retain benefits that he accepted with the 
knowledge that the claimant expected to be compensated. The 
Court decided that this analysis should no longer be 
undertaken.44  
 
                                                
41  Ibid at paras 91-99. 
42  Ibid at paras 110-111. 
43  Ibid at para 116. 
44  Ibid at para 121. 
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 Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co45 set out a two-step test 
for juristic reason. The first step is to determine whether there 
is a juristic reason in established categories such as a contract 
or gift. If not, in the second step the defendant can establish a 
new juristic reason. The new approach is that the legitimate 
expectations of both parties can be considered at the second 
stage where the defendant seeks to establish a new juristic 
reason. For example, reasonable expectations can establish that 
there was a “bargain” between the parties as to whether the 
defendant would retain the benefits.46  
 
Disposition of the Kerr v Baranow Appeal 
 
While the Court of Appeal was correct to dismiss Ms. Kerr's 
resulting trust claim, it should not have dismissed her unjust 
enrichment claim. Instead, a new trial was ordered to re-hear 
both Ms. Kerr's and Mr. Baranow's unjust enrichment claims. 
The trial judge's error regarding Ms. Kerr's equity in the 
Coleman property significantly undermined the trial judgment. 
While the trial judge referred to various other benefits provided 
by Ms. Kerr, he did not make specific findings as to their value, 
and did not evaluate Mr. Baranow's contributions.47  
 
 Even if Ms. Kerr's unjust enrichment claim had been 
made out, the Court also decided that the factual record was 
insufficient to determine whether there was a JFV, because 
“[t]here are few findings of fact relevant to the key question of 
whether the parties' relationship constituted a joint family 
venture.” Further, the Court suggested that “the findings made 
do not appear to demonstrate a joint family venture,” but that it 
                                                
45  Garland v Consumers' Gas Co, 2004 SCC 25, [2004] 1 SCR 629. 
46  Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at paras 123-124. 
47  Ibid at para 196. 
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would be unfair to reach that conclusion without a full 
hearing.48  
 
Disposition of the Vanasse v. Seguin Appeal  
 
By contrast, the Court found that the trial record in Vanasse v. 
Seguin did provide sufficient evidence to analyze the facts 
under the four headings and to find a JFV. Key factors were the 
fact that Ms. Vanasse gave up her career to run the home and 
care for the children while Mr. Seguin worked long hours, that 
she was financially dependent upon him, and that they intended 
to marry and viewed themselves as the equivalent of a married 
couple. Mr. Seguin's sacrifices made for the family also 
supported the finding of a JFV. There was a clear link between 
the contributions of Ms. Vanasse and the accumulation of 
wealth, since Mr. Seguin was free from household and child-
rearing responsibilities to focus his efforts on the company.49 
The Court did not comment on the trial judge’s method of 
dividing up the relationship into segments, but held that the 
approach was reasonable in the circumstances and, while it 
should not be used as a template for future cases, it was entitled 




The Court confirmed that a monetary award for unjust 
enrichment may be calculated on a value-survived basis, but 
only upon proof that the parties were engaged in a JFV. The 
Court referred to earlier cases in which the terms “pooling of 
effort”, “common enterprise”, “joint effort”, “teamwork”, and 
even “joint family venture” were used.51 However, the 
                                                
48  Ibid at paras 197-198. 
49  Ibid at paras 145-157. 
50  Ibid at para 158. 
51  Ibid at paras 63-67. 
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characterization of the JFV as a distinct test which must be 
proven in accordance with the factors set out by the Court in 
order to get the value-survived monetary remedy is a new 
development.  
 
 I start from the proposition that the concept of a 
venture between unmarried partners, in which the products of 
their joint efforts are to be shared between them, is a positive 
one. It is an approach that does not require the calculation of 
the value of services provided by each person over the course 
of the relationship, nor a proven contribution to a particular 
property; approaches that can be artificial and difficult from an 
evidentiary perspective. Rather, the overall wealth generated by 
the couple is divided between them such that mutual benefit 
conferral is recognized and one person does not unjustly retain 
the benefits of the other person's contributions.  
 
 Despite this positive change, I will identify three main 
problems with the Court's approach. First, the Court's 
restrictive definition of the JFV may make the value-survived 
remedy difficult to access for women in relationships that do 
not conform to the Court's particular conception of the family. 
Making remedies difficult to access contributes to women's 
inequality. Second, the Court's focus on free choice and 
autonomy and continued insistence that there is a fundamental 
difference between married and unmarried spouses furthers the 
neo-liberal trend in Canadian law. Finally, judges must still 
determine each person's contributions to the venture; an 
exercise fraught with value judgments, which leaves open the 
possibility of women's contributions being de-valued.  
 
The Joint Family Venture: A High Threshold 
  
The Court stressed that unmarried couples are not a 
homogeneous group and stated that  “the goal is for the law of 
unjust enrichment to attach consequences to the way the parties 
have lived their lives, not to treat them as if they ought to have 
Share the Wealth? 
 
lived some other way.”52 While the Court purports to 
objectively evaluate how the parties have actually lived, the 
favourable consequence of characterizing a relationship as a 
JFV only attaches to a particular type of relationship that fits 
the mold provided by the Court in terms of mutual effort, 
economic integration, actual intent and priority of the family. 
 
 In light of the facts in the Kerr v. Baranow case, it is 
quite shocking that the Court suggested that the relationship 
might not qualify as a JFV. The two were together for twenty-
five years, planned and built their “dream home” together and 
each paid different expenses. It was found at trial that Ms. Kerr 
did all housework including after her stroke. There were 
discussions that Ms. Kerr would continue to live in the house 
after Mr. Baranow died, after which the house would go to Mr. 
Baranow's siblings and Ms. Kerr's two sons.53 Mr. Baranow 
made sacrifices for the family including taking an early 
retirement, in part to care for Ms. Kerr.54  
 
 That the facts in Kerr v. Baranow do not necessarily 
result in a JFV may point to the importance of certain factors 
which were not present: having children together, having one 
spouse give up paid labour to act exclusively as a homemaker, 
and explicitly considering the relationship to be equivalent to 
marriage. In the absence of these factors, autonomy may be an 
overriding concern. By contrast, these factors were present in 
Vanasse v. Seguin and the Court easily found a JFV. Yet, even 
though it was found that Ms. Vanasse was an equal contributor 
in the relationship and that her efforts were linked to Mr. 
Seguin’s business success, she was only entitled to an unjust 
enrichment award for the period in which she took on mostly 
domestic activities. This result suggests that the Court is more 
                                                
52  Ibid at para 88. 
53  Kerr, BCSC, supra note 27 at paras 23, 24, 29. 
54  Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at para 175. 
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willing to find a JFV where one spouse works in the paid 
labour force, while the other stays home with children and the 
partners accept that the relationship is similar to a traditional 
marriage. The Court in fact noted that the notion of the JFV is 
similar to the rationale for matrimonial property legislation.55  
 
 In British Columbia, unmarried couples are entitled to 
apply for spousal support if they have lived in a “marriage-like 
relationship”,56 and Ms. Kerr was in fact awarded spousal 
support from Mr. Baranow. Not recognizing a JFV in these 
circumstances would lead to the result that their relationship is 
“marriage-like” within the meaning of the Family Relations Act 
but does not qualify as a JFV. It is not necessarily problematic 
that the criteria for spousal support and a value-survived unjust 
enrichment award differ. Spousal support serves various 
objectives including the relief of economic hardship arising 
from the relationship, while unjust enrichment is concerned 
with the unjust retention of benefits. However, the fact that the 
JFV is a higher threshold than “marriage-like” illustrates how 
difficult a test it is to meet.  
 
 The Court presented the analysis in a formalistic 
manner. The identification of a JFV is an exercise in discerning 
the facts, “tak[ing] into account the particular circumstances of 
the particular relationship" and discovering "how the parties 
actually lived their lives, not . . . the court's view of how they 
ought to have done so.”57 This system of legal reasoning which 
attempts to be impartial, neutral and objective is similar to what 
Ngaire Naffine has referred to as “blind justice”.58 At the same 
time, the Court is comparing the relationship to factors it has 
                                                
55  Ibid at para 61. 
56  Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c 128, s (1)(b). 
57  Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at para 88. 
58  Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist 
Jurisprudence (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990) at 24. 
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set out as the “hallmarks” of the JFV,59 many of which, I argue, 
represent the traditional conservative view of what a marriage 
between a man and a woman should look like. 
 
 Critical Legal Theorists have argued that formalistic 
legal reasoning “helps to shore up and entrench the existing, 
inequitable social order by representing it as inevitable and 
natural.”60 Indeed, the Court in Kerr v. Baranow, while 
discussing numerous precedents in which women have 
struggled to use trust remedies to get a share of property held 
by their husbands, made no mention of women's inequality. 
The law of unjust enrichment was presented as a gender-neutral 
legal doctrine of general application, rather than as a strategy, 
which, in the family law context, has been used to remedy the 
unfairness experienced by women at the end of relationships 
with men. Catharine MacKinnon has argued that the objective, 
neutral perspective taken in formal legal reasoning is in fact the 
male perspective, which advances male interests.61 However, 
the development of the JFV is better viewed as a doctrine 
fraught with contradictions. As T.B. Dawson has observed, 
some laws will work for some women while oppressing 
others.62 The recognition of a JFV for a woman who has lived 
in a traditional relationship caring for children is no doubt a 
good result, since single mothers face one of the highest levels 
of poverty in Canada.63 By shifting wealth into the hands of 
                                                
59  Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at para 87. 
60  Naffine, supra note 58 at 28. 
61  Catharine A MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the 
State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence” (1983) 8:4 Signs 635. 
62  T Brettel Dawson, “Law: A Primer” in T Brettel Dawson, ed, Women, 
Law and Social Change: Core Readings and Current Issues, 5th ed 
(Concord, ON: Captus Press, 2009) 65 at 71. 
63  Statistics Cananda, Income in Canada (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 
2007) at 15-16. 
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(some) women, the JFV can be used to further (some) women's 
equality.  
 
 However, due to the high threshold for the JFV, more 
women are left with the status quo. This result reflects the 
limitations of formal equality arguments that have been made 
in the development of the law of unjust enrichment. Many of 
the arguments related to common-law partners have rested on 
the idea that they are exactly the same as married couples. For 
example, Ms. Becker and Mr. Pettkus were described as living 
together “as husband and wife, although unmarried.”64 
Although the formal equality challenge in Walsh failed, the 
definition of the JFV illustrates how formal equality ideas 
about common-law partners still underpin the unjust 
enrichment analysis. Unfortunately, the Court did not accept 
L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s argument in Walsh that it is the 
consequences of relationship breakdown – and not necessarily 
the relationships themselves – that are the same in both cases.65  
 
 In the absence of a JFV, a woman may still have a 
claim in unjust enrichment but the award must be based on a 
fee-for-services calculation or on a contribution to a specific 
property. The effect of non-recognition of a JFV is thus biased 
towards allowing the partner who holds title to more assets in 
his name to keep them and to enjoy the benefits of any increase 
in their value. Since, in a heterosexual relationship, the person 
with more assets is likely to be the male partner, while the 
negative impacts of forgone economic opportunities are likely 
to be suffered by the female partner,66 the result is to perpetuate 
women's inequality. 
 
                                                
64  Pettkus, supra note 16 at 849. 
65  Walsh, supra note at 19 para 182. 
66  See e.g. Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813, (1992) 99 DLR (4th) 456, 
L'Heureux-Dubé J. 




Under the heading of “actual intent”, the Court asserted that 
“[u]nderpinning the law of unjust enrichment is an appropriate 
concern for the autonomy of the parties, and this is a 
particularly important consideration in relation to domestic 
partnerships.”67 Given that the word “autonomy” did not 
appear in any of the earlier cases on unjust enrichment, such as 
Rathwell, Pettkus, Sorochan and Peter, it is unclear how 
autonomy could be said to underpin the law of unjust 
enrichment. Rather, the focus on autonomy is more in line with 
the view of domestic relationships taken recently by the Court 
in Walsh.  
 
 Hester Lessard has explained the re-invigoration of 
traditional marriage and the focus on choice in Walsh in terms 
of the neo-liberal shift in Canadian law.68 The neo-liberal 
movement has been marked by government efforts to shift its 
responsibility for social welfare to the private sector. One way 
to cause this shift between public and private is through 
policies of familialization, which involve increased reliance on 
families “to perform the work of social reproduction and to 
care for those in need.”69 Thus, for example, the liberalization 
of marriage to include same-sex couples is consistent with this 
trend because it increases the number of “insiders” to the 
marriage regime who can be relied on for private support.70 
 
 By endorsing the traditional account of marriage, 
which excludes common-law partners, Walsh would seem to be 
at odds with the neo-liberal agenda because the socially 
                                                
67  Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at para 94.  
68  Hester Lessard, "Charter Gridlock: Equality Formalism and Marriage 
Fundamentalism" (2006) 33 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 291. 
69  Ibid at 298. 
70  Ibid at 296. 
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conservative, exclusionary view of marriage denies private 
benefits to unmarried partners who may then look to the state 
for social assistance. Lessard argues that the neo-liberal logic is 
restored, however, when one considers that Walsh does not 
only revive the importance of marriage but, crucially, 
characterizes it as one among many lifestyle choices that 
people make.71 The broader impacts of this characterization of 
marriage as a choice are evident in Hodge v. Canada (Minister 
of Human Resources Development)72 which denied public 
benefits under a survivor's pension to an unmarried woman that 
would have been available to her had she been married.  
 
 Whereas Walsh constructed choice in the liberal sense 
of freedom from state power exemplified by the choice not to 
marry, Hodge constructed choice in the neo-liberal sense as the 
marker of the responsible individual. For women, the 
underlying assumption is that material security is achieved 
through marriage to a man. Thus, women who do not make the 
choice to marry have not acted responsibly and should not 
expect to get the benefits.73  
 
 The Court's focus on choice and autonomy in Kerr v. 
Baranow is consistent with the neo-liberal logic identified by 
Lessard. The definition of the JFV is part of the project of re-
valorizing the socially conservative family. Partners whose 
relationship rises to the level of the JFV display sufficient 
“actual intent” to have a relationship equivalent to marriage to 
justify a property division similar to that available to married 
partners. A woman whose relationship does not qualify as a 
JFV has made a life choice not only not to marry, but not to 
structure her relationship so that it closely resembles a 
                                                
71  Ibid at 305-307. 
72  Hodge v Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), 2004 
SCC 65, [2004] 3 SCR 357 [Hodge]. 
73 Lessard, supra note 70 at 312-314. 
Share the Wealth? 
 
traditional marriage. She cannot expect the law of unjust 
enrichment to undo her free choice, just as the women in Walsh 
and Hodge could not expect Charter rights to undo their free 
choices.74  
 
 Sherene Razack has identified problems with the 
liberal rights discourse that constructs people as independent, 
decontextualized individuals. The notion of free choice makes 
oppression invisible; each individual woman chooses her own 
fate.75 However, Razack does not discount arguments based on 
women's oppression in terms of their lack of choice and 
autonomy. Given the established importance of these concepts 
in our legal system, using them may be an important strategic 
direction.76 An argument based on lack of choice can be made 
with regard to domestic partnerships, since the terms of a 
relationship cannot be chosen by each individual. As 
L'Heureux-Dubé J. argued in her dissenting reasons in Walsh, 
for many unmarried cohabitants, the choice of one to marry is 
denied by the wishes of the other, which can result in an 
exploitative situation.77 Further, to the extent that a woman 
does have a choice as to the terms of her relationship, it is 
arguably constrained by the fact that she cannot have both an 
unmarried “non-traditional” relationship characterized by a 
degree of economic independence from her partner, and expect 
to have a fair division of property when the relationship ends.  
 
 The shift in the law made by the Court with respect to 
legitimate expectations is consistent with the characterization 
of the relationship as a choice. Rather than focusing on the 
                                                
74  Ibid at 312. 
75  Sherene Razack, Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race, 
and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms (Toronto: Toronto 
University Press, 1998) at 23-27. 
76  Ibid at 33-35. 
77  Walsh, supra note 17 at 152, 171. 
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legitimate expectations of the woman who has provided 
services with a view to being fairly compensated, the person 
receiving the benefits now has the opportunity to argue that he 
deliberately chose not to marry and expected her not to be 
compensated. This analysis would seem to reinforce rather than 
prevent the exploitative situation identified by L'Heureux-Dubé 
J., in which one partner refuses to marry in order to avoid the 




Simone Wong has identified gender bias in the English 
approach to constructive trusts. Today in England, common 
intention to share property is understood to give rise to a 
constructive trust rather than a resulting trust.78 A constructive 
trust can be imposed if the defendant promised or 
acknowledged an intention to share property and the claimant 
acted to her detriment in reliance on the promise. Wong argues 
that this approach fails to take into account the economic 
inequality of women and the effects of the sexual division of 
labour.79 While the focus is on finding a common intention to 
share property, the cases illustrate that much turns on the 
existence of a sufficient financial contribution by the claimant, 
and indirect contributions such as domestic services have not 
been adequately recognized.80 She suggests that the unjust 
enrichment approach in Canada may be less susceptible to 
gender bias due to the flexibility of considering indirect 
contributions.81 Of course, the effectiveness of reducing gender 
bias by taking into account domestic work depends on the 
value courts are willing to place on those contributions relative 
to workforce participation and financial contributions. 
                                                
78  Waters, Gillen, & Smith, supra note 3 at 421. 
79  Wong, supra note 2 at 370-371. 
80  Ibid at 377. 
81  Ibid at 383-386. 
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 The Court in Kerr v. Baranow emphasized that the 
result of an unjust enrichment claim based on a JFV is that 
each partner receives a share of the wealth proportionate to 
their contributions. There is no presumption of equal sharing.82 
Despite this clear direction from the Supreme Court of Canada, 
Berend Hovius has predicted that the natural tendency will be 
for courts to split the gain attributable to the JFV equally 
between the partners. Noting that the exercise is one of 
“making value-laden and politically charged assessments,” 
Hovius asks “[w]hat judge . . . is going to find that having the 
primary responsibility for child-care and the household is not 
equal to financial provision?”83 
 
 Historically, women's unpaid work in the home has not 
been treated as economically valuable. In Murdoch, one of the 
reasons for denying a share of property to Ms. Murdoch was 
that her labour “was not beyond what is normally expected of a 
wife.”84 Even Laskin J., who would have allowed her claim, 
recognized the value of her labour by reference to how far 
beyond “normal” it was. Over time, courts began to recognize 
that ordinary domestic services have economic value. In the 
unjust enrichment context, this recognition culminated in the 
Peter decision. However, the value of women's unpaid work 
has been understated due to the historic disadvantage of women 
in the workplace.85 Calculating the value of a woman's services 
results in a small fee since such services are not highly valued 
in the market.  
 
                                                
82  Kerr, SCC, supra note 1 at 63. 
83  Berend Hovius, "Property Disputes Between Common-Law Partners: 
The Supreme Court of Canada's Decisions in Vanasse v Seguin and 
Kerr v Baranow" (2011) 30 Can Fam LQ 129 at 153-154. 
84  Murdoch, supra note 10 at 439-441. 
85  Kim Brooks, “Valuing Women's Work in the Home: A Defining 
Moment” (2005) 17 CJWL 177 at 186. 
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 Given the history of the judicial treatment of women's 
work in the home, Hovius's prediction that courts will almost 
always value women's contributions equally is rather 
optimistic. While progress continues to be made in the 
recognition of the economic value of women's unpaid work,86 
myths and stereotypes about women's work in the home 
continue to play a role. Where both partners work outside the 
home, some courts have been under the misperception that this 
translates into both partners putting in equal amounts of work 
in the home.87 In fact, most unpaid work in the home is still 
done by women.88   
 
 Thus, even if Hovius's prediction holds true in a 
traditional relationship where one partner works inside the 
home and one undertakes paid work outside the home, women 
in relationships which differ from this model, because both 
partners undertake paid work or do not have children, may find 
their contributions de-valued or ignored. While both Ms. Kerr 
and Mr. Baranow worked outside the home until Ms. Kerr's 
stroke, it was a finding of fact at trial that Ms. Kerr did all of 
the housework prior to and after the stroke;89 a fact that was not 
mentioned in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision. 
Likewise, Ms. Vanasse received no compensation for the time 
                                                
86  For example, in the context of tort damages for loss of ability to 
perform unpaid work, Fobel v Dean represented a defining moment 
for the fair compensation of women's loss of ability to perform 
household services (ibid). 
87  Regina Graycar, “Hoovering as a Hobby and Other Stories: Gendered 
Assessments of Personal Injury Damages”  (1997) 31 UBC L Rev 17 
at 28-29. 
88  Anne Milan, Leslie-Anne Keown & Covadonga Robles Urquijo, 
“Families, Living Arrangements and Unpaid Work” in Women in 
Canada: A Gender-Based Statistical Report (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada, 2011) at 20-22. 
89  Kerr, BCSC, supra note 27 at 24, 29. 
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where both she and Mr. Seguin worked, nor after Mr. Seguin 
sold his company even though she continued to be primarily 
responsible for the household and childcare.   
 
 Further, since women continue to earn less than men in 
the paid work force,90 women generally have less capacity to 
make financial contributions to the JFV in a heterosexual 
relationship. Assuming that both partners work full time 
outside the home and share the housework equally, the woman 
is likely to make a smaller salary and have less money to 
contribute to the purchase of assets. An unequal sharing of the 
wealth generated by the JFV in such a situation thus 
perpetuates the inequality, whereas an equal sharing such as 
that mandated by matrimonial property legislation serves a 




The concept of a joint family venture between domestic 
partners in which they share the wealth generated during the 
relationship is a useful concept that reflects the reality that 
partners' lives are economically intertwined, both confer 
various benefits on one another and both contribute to the 
acquisition of wealth, regardless of who holds legal title to 
property. A fair property division at the end of a domestic 
relationship recognizes that the consequences of relationship 
breakdown do not depend on marital status. Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has given the JFV a limited scope by 
defining the JFV narrowly and by reference to factors present 
in a traditional marriage. The Court introduced into the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment a focus on choice and autonomy 
in domestic relationships consistent with the neo-liberal agenda 
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and the reassertion of the fundamental importance of marriage. 
A JFV is still a second-class citizen to marriage, since the 
Court has mandated that sharing should not be equal but should 
be proportional, which means it is left to the discretion of 
courts to value women's contributions.  
 
 The British Columbia Supreme Court, on re-hearing 
the unjust enrichment claims of Ms. Kerr and Mr. Baranow, 
determined that they were in fact engaged in a JFV. Mr. 
Baranow was unjustly enriched by Ms. Kerr’s contributions 
linked to the Wall Street property, but his contributions to her 
welfare and care reduced the amount she was entitled to. In the 
result, she received a monetary award of $240,000, equivalent 
to 25% of the value of the Wall Street property, and both 
parties were entitled to keep their personal savings, of which 
Mr. Baranow had significantly more. The Court emphasized 
that the couple kept their finances separate during the 
relationship,91 consistent with the focus on autonomy and 
intent. 
 
 In British Columbia, this decision will have limited 
ongoing significance when the new Family Law Act92 comes 
into force. Persons who have lived in a marriage-like 
relationship for at least 2 years will be subject to the same 
property division as married spouses. In general, spouses will 
have a right to an undivided half interest in all “family 
property”, defined as property owned by at least one spouse at 
the date of separation, unless defined as “excluded property”.93 
Property acquired by a spouse prior to the relationship is 
excluded, but any increase in its value over the course of the 
relationship is not.  
 
                                                
91  Kerr v Baranow, 2012 BCSC 1222 at paras 70, 106. 
92  Family Law Act, supra note 23. 
93  Ibid, ss 81, 84-85.  
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 If the Family Law Act had been in force, Ms. Kerr 
would have been presumptively entitled to half of the increase 
in the Wall Street property’s value, around $370,000, in 
addition to half of all other family property owned by the 
couple including Mr. Baranow’s substantial savings. Ms. 
Vanasse would have been entitled to half of the increase in the 
wealth generated by Mr. Seguin’s company over the course of 
the entire relationship, rather than a limited time period. Both 
women would have been entitled to significantly more than 
they received due to unjust enrichment, without the need to 
prove the existence of a JFV and to rely on the complex and 
uncertain unjust enrichment and trust principles.94 This will 
continue to be the reality for unmarried cohabitants in the 
Canadian jurisdictions that have not chosen to include 
unmarried couples in their family property regimes.  
 
                                                
94  See e.g. the dissenting reasons of L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Walsh, supra 
note 19 at paras 164-169, where she discusses the significant 
difficulties facing litigants in unjust enrichment actions as compared 
with the simpler alternative of the presumed entitlement to 50 percent 
for married spouses.  
